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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Michael C. Coyle appeals his conviction and sentence on 
three counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, five counts of 
making false statements on documents required by ERISA, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1027, and two counts of blackmail, 18 U.S.C. § 873.   
I. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
 Michael C. Coyle was the Chief Financial Officer for 
Health Corporation of America (HCA) from December 1986 through 
October 1990.  HCA, a publicly traded corporation, was in the 
business of designing, operating and administering medical, 
dental and vision care plans.  It had two subsidiaries: the North 
American Dental Administrators (NADA) and the Cytex Corporation. 
Through the assistance of Larry Smith, the principal of Eastern 
State Casualty Associates, HCA was awarded three contracts by the 
United Paper Convertors Local 286 Welfare Trust Fund to 
administer plans providing health care benefits to members of the 
Paper Convertors Local 286.  These are employee benefit plans 
subject to Title I, as amended, of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145.  The 
duration of these particular contracts is unclear from the record 
although it appears that the contracts were renewed prior to 
their eventual termination in 1990. 
 NADA administered the Fund's dental plans for members 
in New Jersey (New Jersey dental plan).  Cytex administered the 
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Fund's dental plan for members in Pennsylvania and Delaware 
(referred to here as the Pennsylvania dental plan).  A division 
of Cytex, National Vision Plan (NVP), administered the Fund's 
vision care plan.  The companies will be referred to collectively 
as HCA. 
 HCA received monthly premiums from the Fund, which were 
calculated at a fixed rate per covered employee per month, and 
HCA made the payments to participating physicians, dentists and 
laboratories.  The Pennsylvania dental contract covered about 
2700 members while the New Jersey dental contract covered about 
300.  Under the contracts covering the vision care plan and the 
New Jersey dental plan, all premium payments not disbursed to 
participating physicians or laboratories or retained as 
administrative costs were to be returned to the Fund.  There was 
no similar provision for refund of surplus premiums in the 
Pennsylvania dental contract although the contracts appear to 
have functioned similarly in all respects.  In particular, there 
was no refund of any premiums under any of the contracts. 
 All three contracts contained provisions for assuring 
disclosure to and record inspection by the Fund, and required HCA 
to prepare and submit to the Fund annual reports containing 
complete and accurate accounting of all funds received and 
disbursements made. 
 Under ERISA, the Fund was required to file a federal 
Form 5500, also referred to as the "annual report," showing 
financial information of, inter alia, assets and liabilities, 
income and expenses, including the amounts and purposes of 
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disbursements and money retained.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1023.  Form 
5500 is filed with the Internal Revenue Service which provides 
copies to the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation.  Schedules A, attached to Form 5500, must 
be filed for every defined benefit plan when any benefits are 
"purchased from and guaranteed by an insurance company, insurance 
service, or other similar organization."  29 U.S.C. § 1023(e). In 
addition, ERISA obliges "an insurance carrier or other 
organization which provides some or all of the benefits under the 
plan, or holds assets of the plan" to transmit and certify 
certain information to the plan administrator, here the Fund, to 
assist in its preparation of the annual report.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§1023(a)(2)(A).  The information received by the Fund must be 
maintained publicly.  29 U.S.C. § 1026(a). 
 It was Coyle's responsibility to approve all 
disbursements to service providers on behalf of the Fund and to 
prepare or to direct the preparation of the financial reports 
submitted to the Fund.  Pursuant to the Fund's request, Coyle 
prepared or supervised the preparation of the Schedules A for 
1986, 1987 and 1988 which HCA transmitted to the Fund's 
accountants for inclusion with the federal Forms 5500. 
 Joseph R. Cusumano, the Chief Executive Officer of HCA 
until 1990, devised a scheme whereby HCA would conceal the true 
amount of disbursements and administrative costs, and thereby 
retain as administrative retention a higher amount than reported 
to the Fund or than permissible under at least some of the 
contracts and under New Jersey law.  See Dental Plan Organization 
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Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:48D-1 to 17:48D-24 (West 1985 and 
Supp. 1995).  In order to effectuate this scheme, Coyle prepared 
the Schedules A with false or distorted figures, overstating the 
amounts paid to medical service providers and understating the 
amounts retained by HCA.  Agent James L. Black, Department of 
Labor, Office of Labor Racketeering, testified that Coyle 
understated the amount of premiums retained by HCA by $84,000 in 
1986, and $214,000 in 1987 and 1988.  The government's evidence 
shows an understatement of administrative retention by $298,000 
during the relevant period.  Coyle does not contest that the 
figures provided by HCA were false or that he was responsible for 
submitting them falsely. 
 When the scheme was uncovered, Coyle was indicted on 
charges of mail fraud, false statements on documents required by 
ERISA, and blackmail of Cusumano.  By the time of Coyle's trial, 
Cusumano, who had been convicted by a jury in 1990 on a 49-count 
indictment for defrauding another welfare benefit plan, see 
United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992), was no longer involved with HCA. In 
fact, Cusumano testified for the prosecution at Coyle's trial in 
this case.  The jury returned a verdict against Coyle on all 
counts, and Coyle was sentenced to twenty-seven months 
incarceration with three years supervised release and restitution 
of $298,330.00. 
 On appeal, Coyle challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence on the mail fraud counts, the propriety of the jury 
instructions on the false statements and blackmail counts, and 
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the district court's imposition of enhancements under the 
sentencing guidelines for abuse of trust and the amount of the 
fraud loss incurred by the Fund. 
II. 
Mail Fraud Conviction 
 Coyle first argues that the evidence with respect to 
the mail fraud was insufficient for the jury to find that he 
engaged in a scheme intended to defraud the Fund or that the 
mailings of the Schedules A were in furtherance of the fraudulent 
scheme.  When the sufficiency of the evidence at trial is 
challenged, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government.  Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 
(1942).  A claim of insufficiency of evidence places a very heavy 
burden on the appellant.  We must affirm the convictions if a 
rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by substantial 
evidence.  United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107, and cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 968, and cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991).  
 The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, proscribes 
any "scheme or artifice to defraud" in which the defendant 
participated with the specific intent to defraud and in which the 
mails were used "in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme." United 
States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994).  The scheme 
"need not be fraudulent on its face but must involve some sort of 
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated 
to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension."  
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United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(citation omitted).  Proof of specific intent is required, id. at 
537, which "may be found from a material misstatement of fact 
made with reckless disregard for the truth." Hannigan, 27 F.3d at 
892 n.1. 
 Coyle argues that the Fund was not induced to enter 
into these contracts by fraud.  The issue before us is not 
whether there was fraud in the inducement of the contract, but 
whether Coyle intentionally engaged in a scheme by which the Fund 
was defrauded of premiums under the guise of administrative 
costs.  There is sufficient evidence that there was such a 
scheme, and that Coyle knowingly participated in it. 
 There was testimony that the amounts reported on the 
Schedules A which Coyle prepared for the Fund did not accurately 
reflect the administrative costs retained and the amounts paid to 
providers.  App. at 259-64.  Cusumano, who was intimately 
involved in the scheme, testified that "we reported improperly, 
with my full knowledge, and kept more dollars for administration 
than we were supposed to where we were compelled to by the New 
Jersey contract and kept more dollars in Pennsylvania by not 
paying the dentists as many dollars as we were supposed to pay 
them, through various functions, we kept an excessive amount of 
dollars for administration so that we could keep the company 
going."  App. at 54. 
 Cusumano also testified that Coyle was the HCA 
representative who dealt with the Fund.  App. at 56.  Moreover, 
it was Coyle who supervised the preparation of the Schedules A by 
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the HCA staff and he personally provided the figures for 
administrative costs.  App. at 44. 
 HCA accountant Keith Geyer explained that, rather than 
following standard accounting procedures, Coyle set an amount to 
report for administrative retention and directed him to subtract 
that amount plus the amount of Smith's commissions from the 
premiums received to arrive at the amount HCA reported as "claims 
paid."  Cusumano testified that a fair retention rate for 
administrative costs would have been at most in the low 20% of 
the total premiums received, App. at 60, and Alex Johns, a 
consultant hired by the Fund, testified that 10% was a fair rate. 
Agent Black produced documents evidencing that HCA's actual 
retention rate (including the amount paid in commissions) was 
between 30% and 70%.  See App. at 251-64. 
 Coyle argues that the Fund Trustees were not deceived 
by HCA because they knew that HCA was not accounting to the Fund 
based on HCA's actual payments to the providers but was instead 
accounting to the Fund on the basis of the "usual, customary and 
reasonable" value of the providers' services.  Coyle notes that 
although Johns had advised the Trustees that the Fund might be 
entitled to a refund from HCA and that it should cancel its 
contracts with HCA, the Fund did not take that advice.  In 
addition, Coyle argues that the government failed to produce any 
evidence that the Fund Trustees reviewed the Schedules A. 
 To the extent that Coyle is arguing the Fund was 
negligent in ignoring Johns' advice and in failing to review the 
Schedules A, we reject the relevance of those allegations, even 
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if true.  The negligence of the victim in failing to discover a 
fraudulent scheme is not a defense to criminal conduct.  United 
States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1980).  As 
Cusumano explained, the false reporting was necessary to the 
scheme to retain the excessive administrative costs, because the 
consequence of accurate reporting would have been that they 
"would have had to lower the price for the ensuing year" for that 
contract.  App. at 54.  As for the Fund's reliance, Jack Klein, 
the Fund's accountant, testified that he had no obligation to 
independently verify the validity of the figures provided by HCA 
and, therefore, did not do so.  An employer trustee for the Fund, 
Theodore Seidenberg, who was later co-chair of Local 286's health 
and welfare and pension boards, testified that the Trustees would 
never have agreed to contract with HCA if they had known that HCA 
was withholding between 50% and 70% for administrative costs. 
App. at 165.  A rational jury could infer that the Fund was 
deceived by the intentional actions of Coyle and his associates. 
Coyle's participation in HCA's unlawful activities by preparing 
the Schedules A or directing their preparation with false figures 
and the knowledge that the Schedules A would be sent to the 
Fund's accountant and, eventually, to the IRS fully supports the 
conclusion that he intended that the scheme's illicit objectives 
be achieved.  Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 541. 
  Coyle also contends that even if the three Schedules A 
on which the three mail fraud counts are predicated were intended 
to conceal HCA's true profits from the Fund, the mailings did not 
further the scheme.  The three mailings which formed the basis of 
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the three mail fraud counts were a mailing of a Form 5500 with a 
Schedule A by the Fund to the IRS in 1987, (Count One), a mailing 
of a Schedule A by HCA to the Fund's accountant in 1988, (Count 
Two), and a mailing of a Form 5500 with the Schedule A by the 
Fund's accountant to the IRS in 1990, (Count Three).  
 The federal mail fraud statute reaches only the use of 
the mails when that mailing is part of the execution of a fraud. 
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710 (1989) (citing Kann 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944)).  However, the use of 
the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme.  Id. 
(citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954)).  It is 
sufficient if the mailings are "'incident to an essential part of 
the scheme' or 'a step in [the] plot.'"  Id. at 710-11 (quoting 
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)).  We have 
held that the mailings must be sufficiently closely related to 
the scheme to bring the conduct within the ambit of the mail 
fraud statute, United States v. Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 896 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982), and the "scheme's 
completion [must] depend[] in some way on the charged mailings." 
United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).  Even mailings made after the 
fruits of the scheme have been received may come within the 
statute when they are "designed to lull the victims into a false 
sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the 
authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the 
defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place."  Id. 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
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 In this case, there was a basis for the jury to 
conclude that the mailings induced the Fund Trustees to accept 
the accuracy of the financial figures on the Schedules A and made 
apprehension of HCA's fraudulent scheme less likely.  There was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that but for the 
mailings of the Schedules A with the false amounts HCA would have 
been unable to carry out its scheme either because the true 
figures would have prompted an investigation by the Department of 
Labor, see Transcript of Jury Trial, Dec. 1, 1993 (9:30 a.m.) at 
103-16 (Testimony of Howard Hensley, Chief of Division of 
Reporting and Disclosure, Department of Labor), or because the 
Fund's accountants or consultant would have alerted the Fund to 
the amount of HCA's profit, see Transcript of Jury Trial, Dec. 1, 
1993 (9:30 a.m.) at 25-55 (Testimony of Alex Johns), and 
Transcript of Jury Trial, Nov. 30, 1993 (9:30 a.m.) at 133-52 
(Testimony of Jack Klein). 
 Thus, the mailings were incident to an essential part 
of the scheme, i.e., concealing HCA's true profits.  We hold that 
there was sufficient evidence to sustain Coyle's conviction on 
the three counts of mail fraud.  
III. 
False Statements Conviction 
 Counts Four through Eight charged Coyle with making 
false statements on documents required by ERISA in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1027.  That section, which can be read and understood 
more easily with some editorial emphasis and bracketed numerical 
insertions, reads: 
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Whoever, in any document required by title I 
of the [ERISA] to be published, or kept as 
part of the records of any employee welfare 
benefit plan or employee pension benefit 
plan, or certified to the administrator of 
any such plan, [1] makes any false statement 
or representation of fact, knowing it to be 
false, or [2] knowingly conceals, covers up, 
or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure 
of which is required by such title or is 
necessary to verify, explain, clarify or 
check for accuracy and completeness any 
report required by such title to be published 
or any information required by such title to 
be certified, shall be fined under this 
title, or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1027 (emphasis and bracketed numbers added).  This 
court has previously stated that the three elements necessary to 
sustain a conviction under section 1027 are (1) the defendant 
made a false statement; (2) knowing it to be false; and (3) in a 
document required by ERISA.  United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 
558, 568 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990). 
 Coyle does not argue that the government failed to 
prove that he made false statements knowing them to be false. 
Instead he argues that the district court erred in "refus[ing] to 
give the instruction proposed by the defense limiting the jury's 
consideration to only those factual disclosures on the Schedule A 
forms which were legally compelled."  Appellant's Brief at 20. In 
another, but related contention, Coyle argues that the indictment 
charged only one of the disjunctive methods of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1027, but that the court instructed the jury about both, 
and that this led to a fatal variance.  
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   Generally, we review the district court's refusal to 
give certain jury instructions under an abuse of discretion 
standard although where, as here, the question is whether the 
jury instructions stated the proper legal standard, our review is 
plenary.  See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 
1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995).  As on all occasions when we consider 
jury instructions we consider the totality of the instructions 
and not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.  In Re 
Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 626 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1066 (1991).   
 Each of the five false statement counts alleges that 
Coyle "in a document required to be published by ERISA . . . and 
required to be kept as part of an employee welfare benefit plan 
by ERISA" unlawfully and knowingly caused the making of a false 
statement and representation of fact, and that those acts 
violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1027 and 2 (emphasis added).  Each of the 
false statements counts unambiguously charges that the false 
information consisted of "the amounts of claims paid, [HCA's 
payments to the physician and dentist providers]," 
"administrative service or other fees" and "total retention." 
Each false statement count unambiguously charges that the false 
reports with which Coyle is charged appeared in the Schedules A 
prepared by HCA and filed by or on behalf of the Fund as part of 
the Forms 5500. 
 We discern what appear to be several different threads 
to Coyle's challenge to his false statements conviction, none of 
which are convincing.  We do not understand Coyle to argue that 
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the documents, i.e., the Schedules A, were not documents that 
were required by ERISA to be published or kept.  He argues 
instead, in somewhat abbreviated fashion, that HCA does not fall 
within the statutory sections that impose the obligation to make 
the factual disclosures that were proven to be false.  However, 
inasmuch as the false factual statements were in documents 
required by ERISA to be published or kept, Coyle's argument 
misses the mark.   
 29 U.S.C. § 1023 requires an annual report to be 
published and filed with the Secretary of Labor for every covered 
employee benefit plan, and that it contain specified information. 
Subsection (a)(2)(A) requires that if some of the information 
that the administrator, here the Fund Trustees, needs to submit 
the annual report and to comply with title I of ERISA is 
maintained by "an insurance carrier or other organization which 
provides some or all of the benefits under the plan, or holds 
assets of the plan in a separate account," that organization must 
transmit and certify the accuracy of such information to the 
administrator. (emphasis added).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-
5(a).  Subsection (e) requires that information as to, inter 
alia, total claims paid, commissions paid, and administrative 
fees paid be enumerated on a statement included in the annual 
report (the Schedule A) "[i]f some or all of the benefits under 
the plan are purchased from and guaranteed by an insurance 
company, insurance service, or other similar organization." 
(emphasis added). 
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 Coyle contends that HCA is not an "other similar 
organization."  The district court instructed the jury that as a 
matter of law HCA was "a medical service provider" and therefore 
subject to the obligation to transmit and certify information 
needed by the administrator to file its annual report.  In doing 
so, the court relied on our decision in United States v. 
Martorano, 767 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 949 (1985).  In Martorano, a welfare fund had contracted 
with AMMA Health Center, Inc. to provide outpatient medical 
coverage to union members.  Id. at 64.  The Fund requested that 
AMMA prepare utilization reports which it needed to complete Form 
5500.  Martorano, who prepared AMMA's reports, significantly 
understated its profits on the utilization reports, and was 
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1027 for making false statements in 
documents required by ERISA.   
 We rejected Martorano's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1027 
applies only to fiduciaries of union pension and welfare funds 
and does not apply to medical service providers.  We held that by 
selling medical services to the Fund, AMMA fell under the 
statutory coverage of 29 U.S.C. § 1023(e) of ERISA.  Id. 
Therefore, the "understatement of profits by a health care 
organization that furnishes outpatient medical coverage to 
members of a health and welfare fund governed by ERISA 
constitutes a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1027]."  Id. at 64; see 
also United States v. Sarault, 840 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(false statements made by attorney representing an assetless 
insurance company).  We concluded that the language in 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 1027 is broad enough to cover medical service providers and 
reasoned that such a construction would promote the goals of 
ERISA because "[i]f medical service providers are not sanctioned 
for providing false information, plan participants will suffer." 
Martorano, 767 F.2d at 65. 
 Although AMMA, unlike HCA, itself provided the medical 
services, it was HCA that undertook to design, contract for 
and administer the dental and vision care benefit plans for Local 
286's Fund, and it was only HCA that maintained the records and 
was in the position to supply the Fund with the information to 
which 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023(e) and 1023(a)(2)(A) refer.  Moreover, it 
was HCA which held the premiums, i.e., the "assets of the plan" 
as referred to in the statute, in a separate account.  See 
Transcript of Jury Trial, Nov. 30, 1993 (9:30 a.m.) at 140 
(Testimony of Jack Klein).  Therefore, we agree with the district 
court that HCA had the reporting and record-retaining obligations 
that ERISA imposes. 
  Coyle also seems to argue that the false statements can 
be excused because they were made in response to questions on 
Schedules A that apply only if the contracts were "experience-
rated," and Coyle contends the Fund's plans were not because they 
did not set group premiums by evaluating participant utilization 
of medical services.  This is a red herring.  Coyle admits that 
HCA completed the Schedules A on behalf of the Fund for the years 
in question as though the contracts were "experience-rated," and 
that the figures for claims paid and administrative costs 
retained in the responses to those questions were false.  Coyle's 
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argument on the "experience-rated" issue seems based on his 
premise that the crime charged was that of making false 
statements as to factual "disclosures" which were required, but 
as discussed above the crime charged and proven was that the 
false statements appeared on ERISA-required "documents." 
 Moreover, the Fund specifically requested that HCA 
prepare the Schedules A.  HCA was obliged by the statute to 
certify the accuracy of its statements.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§1023(a)(2)(A).  It also had an obligation under title I of ERISA 
to maintain records which provide in sufficient detail 
information from which required documents might be verified and 
checked for accuracy and completeness.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1027. HCA 
purported to comply with its obligations by reporting to the Fund 
on the Schedules A it prepared.  Even if HCA erred by completing 
the section for experience-rated contracts, the information it 
did provide was proven false, thus violating the prohibition of 
18 U.S.C. § 1027 against "making any false statement or 
representation of fact, knowing it to be false" in a document 
ERISA requires be published or kept. 
 Coyle offers no authority to support the implicit and 
rather bold proposition that one may make false statements or 
supply information to the government on required forms, but avoid 
liability if the false information voluntarily supplied may have 
been more than required.  Such an argument would undercut one of 
the purposes of section 1023 of ERISA, which is to enable the 
Department of Labor to use the annual reports and the Schedules A 
to carry out its statutory responsibilities, including the 
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initiation and conduct of investigations to assure the integrity 
of the individual plans and the $205 trillion estimated to be in 
ERISA plan assets.  We thus reject Coyle's contention that the 
court should have limited the jury's consideration to required 
factual "disclosures." 
 Coyle's other argument, i.e., that the instruction the 
court did give was erroneous because the indictment charged only 
one of the two methods of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1027 but the 
court charged as to both, also stems from Coyle's preoccupation 
with the "disclosure" language.  Admittedly, in this respect the 
indictment could have been more carefully drawn, but we see no 
reversible error in the charge. 
 To understand we return to the statute, and the 
disjunctive crimes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1027.  The statute as 
read by this court, and as read by Coyle, is set forth in the 
Appendix to this opinion. 
 The district court's comprehensive charge correctly 
delineated both crimes.  The court explained that the indictment 
charged Coyle, inter alia, with "false statements and concealment 
of facts in relation to documents required by [ERISA]."  App. at 
422-23 (emphasis added).  After explaining that the jury must 
find that the Fund fell within ERISA, the court stated that the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that [1] the 
defendant made or caused the making of a false statement or 
representation of fact knowing it to be false or [2] knowingly 
concealed, covered up or failed to disclose any fact, the 
disclosure of which is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or 
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check for accuracy and completeness any form 5500 Schedules A 
published by the Local 286 Paper Converters Welfare Trust Fund." 
App. at 423 (bracketed material and emphasis added).  The court 
then told the jury it must find that the Schedules A submitted by 
Coyle to the Fund were documents required by ERISA, and that 
Coyle acted knowingly. 
 Coyle reads the statute to set out the following two 
methods of violation, i.e., "[t]he first method is by making a 
false statement of fact (or by covering up or failing to disclose 
such fact) the disclosure of which fact is required by Title I of 
ERISA," Appellant's Brief at 19, and the second method is "making 
a false statement of fact, the disclosure of which is not 
required by ERISA, but is nonetheless necessary to verify, 
explain, clarify or check the accuracy or completeness of reports 
which are required to be filed."  Id. at 20.  Coyle misreads the 
statute. 
 The court correctly told the jury that to establish a 
violation the government must prove (1) the knowing making of a 
false statement or representation of fact in an ERISA-required 
document or (2) the knowing concealment, cover-up, or failure to 
disclose any fact the disclosure of which is required or is 
necessary to verify, explain, etc.  One violation deals with the 
making of a false statement, the other with the omitting or 
concealment of relevant facts.  They are separated by an "or" 
with verbs on either side, i.e., "makes any false statement" or 
"knowingly conceals . . ."  The statute would charge a violation 
in grammatical terms even if the language describing one or the 
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other prong were completely eliminated.  In contrast, Coyle's 
reading of the statute erroneously divides the violations in an 
ungrammatical manner.  This is evident from the Appendix to this 
opinion. 
 Coyle's theory of a variance between the indictment and 
the charge may stem from the fact that the indictment contained 
surplus language relating to facts the "disclosure of which is 
required" by ERISA, added to what we have referred to as the 
"making false statement" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 1027.  That 
language more appropriately belongs with the "knowing 
concealment" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 1027, i.e., concealment or 
nondisclosure of a fact "disclosure of which is required . . . or 
is necessary to verify," etc.  The indictment does not expressly 
charge that second violation, although it is arguable that the 
concealment of a necessary fact is but the mirror image of 
supplying false statements of fact, i.e., not disclosing or 
concealing the true facts. 
 Coyle is not entitled to a reversal because of the 
inclusion of the unnecessary "disclosure of which is required" 
language which, at most, is mere surplusage.  It is a long-
standing principle of criminal procedure that "[a] part of the 
indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of 
the offense proved may normally be treated as 'a useless 
averment' that 'may be ignored.'"  United States v. Miller, 471 
U.S. 130, 136 (1985) (quoting Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 
593, 602 (1927)).  Moreover, if the additional language created 
any confusion, the explanation following the "that is" language 
21 
of the same sentence made absolutely clear what the charge 
against Coyle was.  Three false statement counts ended with the 
language, "that is, that defendant caused the filing of a 
Schedule A with the IRS reporting falsely the amounts of claims 
paid, administrative service or other fees, and total retention, 
knowing these amounts to be false."  App. at 16.  The other two 
are similar in respects relevant here.  These charges were 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 Because Coyle contends there was a lack of proof that 
the factual disclosures were required, he frames an argument of a 
fatal variance between the indictment and the proof.  This is a 
far cry from the classic fatal variance case on which Coyle 
relies.  In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the 
Court held that the trial evidence and the instruction so 
broadened the possible bases for conviction that they "destroyed 
the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges 
presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury."  Id. at 
217. 
 Here, the concealed facts were the very facts that were 
the subject of the false statements, i.e., the accurate facts as 
to payments to doctors and dentists and HCA's administrative 
costs.  Thus, the court's instruction did not prejudice Coyle. 
See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 216 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In order to convict Coyle for the crime charged, under both the 
indictment and the court's instructions the jury would have had 
to find that there were false statements made on the Schedules A. 
The indictment identified the false statements made in the 
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Schedules A with the requisite specificity.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7.  There were no other allegedly false documents before the 
jury.  Therefore, the variance, if any, did not alter the 
elements of the offense charged.  See United States v. Asher, 854 
F.2d 1483, 1497 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 
(1989).  See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 
(1970) ("[W]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment 
charging several acts in the conjunctive . . . the verdict stands 
if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts 
charged."). 
 We reject Coyle's contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction or that the district court 
erred in its instruction. 
IV. 
Blackmail Conviction 
 Coyle contends that the district court erred in its 
jury instruction on the blackmail charge.  In so arguing, Coyle 
notes correctly that the case law on blackmail is "sparse." 
Nonetheless, we find no ambiguity in the statutory language 
relevant here. 
 The blackmail statute provides: 
Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a 
consideration for not informing, against any 
violation of any law of the United States, 
demands or receives any money or other 
valuable thing, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both. 
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18 U.S.C. § 873.  The court's instruction closely tracked the 
statutory language.  App. at 429-30. 
 Two blackmail letters were identified in the indictment 
and at trial the government produced evidence of a series of five 
letters written by Coyle to Cusumano beginning October 18, 1990 
and continuing until October 29, 1990.  They alternate between 
vague threats, accusations and demands.  App. at 81-96. 
 In one of these letters, Coyle advised Cusumano that he 
had "been contacted by the FBI to discuss their investigation of 
the expense accounts you provided them earlier this year," 
stated, "I really don't wish to be involved and hope to stonewall 
the request based on unavailability and a lack of a clear memory 
at this time," and then -- in language that leaves no doubt as to 
its purpose -- stated, "Any attempt to tamper with my severance, 
deferred compensation or paid time off adjustment pay or any 
other moneys due me could reflect in my decision.  I know you 
understand."  App. at 87-88. 
 Coyle engages in semantic sophistry when he argues that 
because the payment of the benefits was to come from HCA rather 
than Cusumano, he did not "demand" anything from Cusumano within 
the meaning of the statute.  But the statute does not require 
that the quid pro quo be a two-party transaction.  Coyle's offer 
"to stonewall" the FBI in exchange for receiving Cusumano's 
assistance in securing (or forbearance in interfering with) his 
severance pay from HCA falls within the language of the statute.  
 Coyle argues that the district court erred in denying 
his proposed instruction that he could not be convicted if he was 
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entitled to the benefits he demanded.  He argues that something 
to which he was entitled could not be "consideration."  However, 
what is made unlawful by the blackmail statute is Coyle's use of 
the offer not to report the fraudulent activity or not to 
cooperate with the authorities as leverage over Cusumano, see 
United States v. Smith, 228 F. Supp. 345, 348 (E.D. La. 1964),  
whether or not Coyle had a claim of right to the benefits.  The 
blackmail statute thus reaches those who would evade their 
responsibility to inform the authorities about a violation of the 
law by exchanging the promise to forebear from giving such 
information for some benefit.  It is the use of the information 
in this manner that Congress sought to penalize.  A jury could 
find that this is exactly what Coyle did.  The district court did 
not err in rejecting Coyle's attempt to restrict the scope of the 
blackmail statute. 
V. 
Calculation of Sentence 
 Finally, Coyle raises two claims of error in the 
calculation of his sentence.   
 Coyle claims that the district court erred in enhancing 
his offense level by two points for abuse of a position of trust 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  A sentencing court must first 
determine whether the defendant held a position of trust, a 
purely legal question for which our review is de novo.  United 
States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993).  The second 
question, whether defendant abused his position in a way that 
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significantly facilitated the crime, is a question of fact which 
we review for clear error.  Id. 
 "[O]ne has been placed in a position of trust when, by 
virtue of the authority conferred by the employer and the lack of 
controls imposed on that authority, he is able to commit an 
offense that is not readily discoverable."  Id. at 342; see also 
United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
both Craddock and Lieberman this court affirmed the two-level 
enhancement, finding it significant that the defendants' 
positions--a Western Union teller and a bank vice president, 
respectively--provided them with the "freedom to commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong."  See Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 993 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
 In this case, Coyle's position as Chief Financial 
Officer of HCA afforded him the authority to conceal HCA's true 
profits and the evidence fully supports the conclusion that the 
Fund's reliance on his accounting expertise allowed him to commit 
a "difficult-to-detect" wrong.  Coyle's arguments that the 
government was obliged to offer proof that he was in some way a 
fiduciary or that the Trustees were naive are unavailing.  The 
district court's imposition of the two-level enhancement was 
proper. 
 Coyle also challenges the calculation of fraud loss. 
Because Coyle is challenging the district court's legal 
interpretation of "fraud loss," our review is plenary.  United 
States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 936 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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 Under the applicable guideline, the base offense level 
for fraud is six, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a), which must be increased 
according to the size of the loss attributable to the fraud, 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b).  The district court set the amount of fraud 
loss at $298,330, and accordingly enhanced Coyle's offense level 
by eight.  U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(I).  This amount was derived 
from testimony at trial about the difference between the amount 
HCA reported to be its administrative retention on the Schedules 
A and the amount it actually retained.  The government contended 
that this was a reasonable estimate of the fraud loss because 
there was testimony that if the actual amount of administrative 
retention had been accurately reported, the Fund would have 
renegotiated the contract and demanded a refund.  See App. at 164 
(Testimony of Theodore Seidenberg) and App. at 336-41, 351 
(Testimony of Alex Johns).  
 Coyle recognizes that the government's figure may 
accurately measure the magnitude of HCA's misrepresentation of 
its actual costs.  He argues that it does not measure any loss 
suffered by the Fund because the Fund could have at most 
renegotiated lower premium contracts and that the amount of fraud 
loss should be reduced by the percentage of the loss which 
derives from the Pennsylvania dental contract because there was 
no obligation to refund premiums under that contract. 
 "As in theft cases, [fraud] loss is the value of the 
money, property, or services unlawfully taken."  U.S.S.G. §2F1.1, 
comment. (n.7); see also United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 
204 (3d Cir. 1994).  Our precedents establish that "fraud 'loss' 
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is, in the first instance, the amount of money the victim has 
actually lost" revised upward to the "intended or probable loss 
if either amount [is] higher and determinable."  United States v. 
Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 523, 536 (3d Cir. 1991).  But that is not the 
exclusive method of measuring fraud loss.  Under the guidelines 
and our precedent, "the offender's gain from committing the fraud 
is an alternative estimate that ordinarily will underestimate the 
loss."  U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.8); see also Badaracco, 954 
F.2d at 938.  Also, "[t]he loss need not be determined with 
precision [and] [t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate 
of the loss."  U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.8). 
 In Badaracco, we recognized that certain breaches of 
fiduciary duty comparable to embezzlement may justify estimating 
fraud loss by using the "gross gain" alternative, as expressly 
authorized in Application Note 8.  954 F.2d at 938.  In 
Badaracco, a bank president used his position to approve 
financing for real estate developments on the condition that the 
borrowers distribute subcontracting work to companies in which he 
or members of his family had a financial interest.  The district 
court calculated the fraud loss by adding together the value of 
the contracts awarded to defendant's family companies.  Defendant 
appealed, claiming that the court should have calculated the loss 
based on the net profit earned by the family companies rather 
than the face value of the contracts.  Id. at 936. 
 In affirming this aspect of the sentence, we referred 
to our opinion in Kopp, where we declined to accept an automatic 
equation between loss in fraud cases and in theft cases.  In 
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theft cases, "loss" was defined as "amount taken."  In Kopp, we 
had explained that "embezzlement," which is placed under the 
theft guideline, involves "not only a taking but also an action 
akin to a breach of fiduciary duty, which might justify always 
using the amount taken as 'loss.'"  951 F.2d at 530 n.13.  Thus, 
we held that under the circumstances in Badaracco, i.e., "the 
officer of a financial institution [who] uses his or her position 
for personal benefit, there is a breach of fiduciary duty 
comparable to that implicated by embezzlement."  954 F.2d at 938. 
This justified using the defendant's "gross gain" as set forth in 
Application Note 8. 
 For similar reasons, we hold that it was appropriate 
for the district court to adopt "amount taken" or "gross gain" as 
the measure of fraud loss, i.e., the difference between the 
amount reported and the amount retained.  Inasmuch as this 
encompasses "gross gain," we reject Coyle's contention that the 
amount of fraud loss should be reduced by the amount of 
administrative retention attributable to the Pennsylvania 
contract even though there was no explicit requirement that 
surplus funds be returned in that contract.  The circumstances of 
this scheme have a strong resemblance to embezzlement, and HCA's 
position vis-a-vis the Fund had elements strongly comparable to 
those of Badaracco's relationship to the bank.  Thus, the 
district court's use of the $298,330 fraud loss figure was in 
keeping with the applicable guidelines, and the district court's 
decision to increase Coyle's base offense level by eight was not 
error. 
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VI. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence imposed by the district court. 
 
____________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
      _________________________ 
      Chief Judge 
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A P P E N D I X 
 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1027 (with emphasis and bracketed numbers supplied by 
court): 
 
 
Whoever, in any document required by title I 
of the [ERISA] to be published, or kept as 
part of the records of any employee welfare 
benefit plan or employee pension benefit 
plan, or certified to the administrator of 
any such plan, [1] makes any false statement 
or representation of fact, knowing it to be 
false, or [2] knowingly conceals, covers up, 
or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure 
of which is required by such title or is 
necessary to verify, explain, clarify or 
check for accuracy and completeness any 
report required by such title to be published 
or any information required by such title to 
be certified, shall be fined under this 
title, or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1027 (with emphasis and bracketed numbers supplied by 
Coyle, Appellant's Brief at 19): 
 
Whoever, in any document required by title I 
of the [ERISA] to be published, or kept as 
part of the records of any employee welfare 
benefit plan or employee pension benefit 
plan, or certified to the administrator of 
any such plan, makes any false statement or 
representation of fact, knowing it to be 
false, or knowingly conceals, covers up, or 
fails to disclose any fact [1] the disclosure 
of which is required by such title or [2] is 
necessary to verify, explain, clarify or 
check for accuracy and completeness any 
report required by such title to be published 
or any information required by such title to 
be certified, shall be fined under this 
title, or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
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  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, United States District Judge for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
